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ABSTRACT
This paper examines dollar interventions by the G3 governments since 1989, and the reasons
that trader reactions to these interventions might differ over time and across central banks. Market
microstructure theory provides a framework for understanding the process by which sterilized
central bank interventions are observed and interpreted by traders, and how this process, in turn,
might influence exchange rates. Using intra-daily and daily exchange rate and intervention data, the
paper analyzes the influence of interventions on exchange rate volatility, finding evidence of both
within day and daily impact effects, but little evidence that interventions increase longer-term
volatility.
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On May 31, 1995 the U.S. government purchased a total of $500 million against 
marks and $500 million against yen on three occasions between the hours of 1:45pm and 
2:26pm (Eastern Standard Time), resulting in a 2% increase in the value of the dollar 
against both the mark and yen over the course of the day.
1  On other occasions when the 
U.S. government intervened in the dollar exchange rate market, however, the dollar either 
moved in the opposite direction to that expected, or did not move at all.  This paper 
examines dollar interventions by the G3 governments since 1989, and the reasons that 
market reactions to these interventions might differ over time and across central banks.   
Standard models of exchange rate determination identify at least two channels 
through which interventions might be expected to influence exchange rates: the portfolio 
balance channel and the signaling channel.  However, neither of these channels is easily 
reconciled with the empirical evidence, which suggests that sometimes intervention 
works and sometimes it does not. Of course, standard exchange rate determination 
models have a difficult time explaining (often the lack of) exchange rate reactions to all 
kinds of purportedly fundamental information, suggesting that it may be worth 
reexamining standard models before drawing conclusions regarding the efficacy of 
intervention. 
One approach to exchange rate modeling that has gone some distance toward 
reconciling observed short- term currency movements and economic theory is the market 
microstructure approach. In the context of intervention, market microstructure provides a 
                                                 
1 During New York trading hours on May 31, 1995 the dem-usd rate opened at 1.385 and closed at 1.4135 
and the yen-usd rate opened at 82.70 and closed at 84.40. The Bundesbank and the BOJ coordinated their 
interventions with the Fed on this day. Reuters reports indicate that the Bundesbank purchased $395.6 
million against the mark on two occasions (starting just before the Fed was in the market), and the BOJ 
purchased $767.4 million against yen on one occasion (just before the last Fed operation).   2
framework for understanding the process by which central bank interventions are 
observed and interpreted by traders, and how this process, in turn, might result in 
exchange rate changes. Even if interventions are informative, for example if they reveal 
information that is considered price relevant, exchange rates might not react immediately 
if traders learn about interventions at different times.  Likewise, if interventions are 
largely non-informative (and are simply a central bank’s attempt to target exchange rates 
away from fundamentals), interventions might still impact prices and volatility in the 
very short-run if traders misinterpret the (lack of) information content of the 
interventions.   
Recent advances in market microstructure theory, new sources of data on 
exchange rates and central bank interventions, and in particular, the availability of high 
frequency data, offer new tools with which to shed light on the old question of when 
central bank interventions are likely to influence exchange rates.
2  Section II offers a 
simple version of a market microstructure model and introduces a role for intervention.  
Section III describes the G3 intervention and exchange rate data. Section IV provides an 
empirical examination of the intra-day and daily dynamics of interventions and exchange 
rate volatility. Section 5 is the conclusion. 
II.  Market Microstructure and Intervention  
    The exchange rate microstructure model developed by Bacchetta and van 
Wincoop (2003) provides a way to think about why trader heterogeneity (based on 
differences in information or the interpretation of information) might lead to short-run price 
                                                 
2 See Dominguez and Frankel (1993ab) and Humpage (1999). Sarno and Taylor (2001) and Edison (1993) 
provide excellent surveys of the intervention literature.  Also, see Dominguez (2003b), Ito (2002), De 
Grauwe and Grimaldi (2003) and Taylor (2003) for recent contributions.   3
and volatility effects in reaction to information revelation.
3  Interventions can easily be 
included in the model with the potential to provide price-relevant information.  In this 
model, both information-based trades and non-informative trades can move exchange rates 
in the short run depending on aggregate market ability to differentiate noise from 
fundamentals.  The model assumes that longer-term exchange rate behavior is well 
explained by fundamentals. 
  Consider a standard asset pricing model of exchange rates in which the current 
exchange rate, et, is the discounted present value of expected macro fundamental 
differentials, Mt+k, and a risk premium, rpt+k, associated with non-fundamentals trade.
4 
Assume traders have higher order expectations, 
k
t E (such that the exchange rate at time t 
depends on the fundamental at time t, and the average expectation of the fundamental in all 
future periods, as a consequence of which the expectation of other investors’ expectations 
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where  b  can be interpreted as the interest semi-elasticity of money demand. If market 
participants receive information (or signals) at time t about future fundamentals, Mt+k, but 
this information is not common knowledge (either because people receive difference bits 
of information or because they interpret the information differently), then there is a 
common average signal among traders (assuming there are large numbers of market 
                                                 
3 See Lyons (2001) for a thorough discussion of market microstructure in foreign exchange markets as well 
as Evans and Lyons (2002ab).  For a more general treatment of market microstructure see O’Hara (1995).   
4 In Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2003) the risk premium arises because some proportion of investors have 
a noisy expected excess return on foreign bonds and the net supply of foreign bonds resulting from the 
expectational error is non-observable (so that the irrational agents do not know their expectational error).   4
participants) but heterogeneity across individuals (and traders will expect their own 
expectation next period to differ from that of others).  Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2003) 
show that this sort of information heterogeneity leads both to magnification and to 
endogenous persistence of the impact of non-fundamentals trade on the exchange rate. 
Government exchange market interventions in this kind of setting may provide 
information to market participants that allows them to distinguish more accurately 
between fundamental and non-fundamental information.  Define an intervention 
operation known to individual i at time t, 
i
t I , as providing information about future 
fundamentals with probability
i
t r , and providing non-fundamentals information with 
probability (1-
i
t r ): 
(1.2)  ()(1)()
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where 
i
t h ￿  is the error term that goes to zero if interventions are common knowledge. If 
the value of
i
t r  is only learned over time, then intervention operations will in the short-
run (beforer  is known) potentially add to the weight of non-fundamentals driven 
exchange rate movements 
  The model implies that, if interventions are “informative” (
i
t r ￿ =1) and are 
common knowledge (
i
t h ￿ =0), then they should help reduce the rational confusion 
(between fundamental and non-fundamental induced exchange rate movements) that arises 
in the Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2003) model.    Likewise, if interventions are not 
common knowledge (
i
t h ￿ „0), or if interventions are uninformative (
i
t r ￿ <1), then 
interventions will increase short-term non-fundamentals induced exchange rate 
movements.  Over time interventions should become common knowledge and the market   5
will learn the value of  r .  Therefore, only those interventions that are informative should 
be expected to have long-term effects on exchange rates.  This suggests that the very 
short-run influence of interventions may differ from its longer run effects. 
  Previous empirical tests of how microstructure issues might influence the 
relationship between intervention and exchange rates include Beattie and Fillion (1999), 
Cai, Cheung, Lee and Melvin (2001), Chang and Taylor (1998), Dominguez (2003a), 
Evans and Lyons (2001), Fischer and Zurlinden (1999), Goodhart and Hesse (1993), 
Neely (2002), Pasquariello (2001, 2002), Payne and Vitale (forthcoming) and Peiers 
(1997).  Each of these studies focuses on the effects of different central banks over 
different sample periods, often using different data sets, making cross study comparisons 
difficult. As a general matter, and in contrast to papers that study the longer-term effects 
of sterilized central bank interventions, studies examining intra-daily effect of 
intervention find strong evidence of impact effects.
5 
  LeBaron’s (1999) finding that intervention days are the source of unusual profits 
for traders using technical analysis is noteworthy in this context.  He finds that simple 
moving average trading rule profits are significant in daily forex data if intervention days 
are included in the sample -- when interventions are excluded, profits go to zero. Using 
more finely timed data, Neely (2002) however, finds that interventions are unlikely to have 
“caused” the increase in trading rule profits, but instead that interventions tend to arise 
                                                 
5 For example, Peiers (1997) examines how interactions between informed (defined to be indications 
provided by Deutsche Bank (DB)) and uninformed foreign exchange traders (indications given by all other 
banks) give rise to short-term price leadership during periods of central bank intervention.  She finds that, 
during the period October 1992 to September 1993, volatility increases five minutes prior to Bundesbank 
interventions, and that there is evidence of DB price leadership from 60 to 25 minutes prior to Reuters 
reports. 
   6
during periods when exchange rates are trending in a manner that would likely lead to 
technical trading rule profits. 
III.  G3 Intervention and Exchange Rate Data 
 
  The intra-daily exchange rate data used in this paper are the Reuter’s FXFX series 
tick-by-tick indicative quotes on Fed intervention days as well as a control sample of 25 
days with no interventions.
6  A limitation of the FXFX data is that because they are quotes 
and not transactions they do not provide volume information, so it is not possible to 
examine the joint dynamics of volume (or order flow) and price.
7 Another disadvantage of 
the data set is that, because it includes only intervention days, it is not possible to measure 
persistent effects of interventions. 
The FXFX data used in the paper cover 69 days over the period August 1989 to 
August 1995 when the Fed intervened in the dem-usd market, and 66 days when the Fed 
intervened in the yen-usd market.
8  The propensity to intervene on a given day varied 
across the sample period. The U.S, Japanese and German governments all intervened 
actively in the early part of the sample, while only the Bank of Japan (BOJ) continued to 
actively intervene after 1992. Figures 1 and 2 show daily U.S. dollar intervention 
                                                 
6 The data are collected by Olsen and Associates (Research Institute for Applied Economics,  Zurich 
Switzerland) using O&A proprietary real-time data collection software and are filtered as recommended by 
Dacorogna et al. (1993). The control dates were selected to provide a representative sample of non-
intervention days over the period when the intervention operations take place.  These data are used to create 
the volatility seasonal used in the empirical tests to follow. 
7 Goodhart et al. (1996) and Danielsson and Payne (2002) find that the basic characteristics of 5-minute 
FXFX returns closely match those calculated for transactions prices but find that quote frequency and bid-
ask spreads in the FXFX data are not good proxies to transaction volume or spreads. 
8 Two additional Fed intervention operations have occurred since August 1995. On June 17, 1998 the Fed 
sold $833 million against the yen in cooperation with the BOJ and on September 22, 2000 the Fed 
purchased a total of 1.5 billion euros against the dollar in cooperation with the ECB, the BOJ, the Bank of 
Canada and the Bank of England.   7
operations in the mark and yen markets along with the corresponding bilateral exchange 
rates over the sample period.
9   
The G3 central banks release historical daily intervention data.  Unfortunately, 
they do not provide the exact timing of interventions, nor do they disclose how many 
operations occurred over the course of the day.
10   The only available source of timing 
information for G3 interventions comes from Reuters reports of interventions (which is 
also the most likely source of information for those traders in the market that are not 
directly involved in the intervention transaction).  
The Reuters news reports used in this study are from the Reuters AAMM Page 
News (Money Market Headline News).  Along with reports of central bank intervention, 
the Reuters data include announcements of various macroeconomic statistics, statements by 
central bank and government officials and reports of major economic events.  In order to 
control for the impact of other news on exchange rates, these Reuters news reports are also 
included in the empirical work.  In particular, dummy variables indicate the timing of all 
major macroeconomic announcements and statements regarding exchange rate policy by 
officials of the G-3 central banks on the intervention sample days. Table 1 lists each of the 
dummy variables created from the Reuters reports and the day-of-week and average time 
(GMT) when the announcements are made. 
                                                 
9 In the United States the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve have independent legal authority to 
intervene in foreign exchange markets. In practice, the U.S. Treasury and the Fed typically act jointly and 
split the costs of intervention equally against their separate accounts.  The New York Fed implements 
intervention policy for the United States and for this reason I follow the convention of associating U.S. 
intervention operations with the Fed in the paper.  Similarly, in Japan intervention decisions are made by 
the Ministry of Finance and implemented by the Bank of Japan (BOJ).  The Bundesbank had sole 
jurisdiction over German intervention decisions and implemented intervention operations prior to 1999. 
10 The Swiss National Bank is an exception. The SNB provides exact timing and transaction prices for 
interventions (see Fischer and Zurlinden (1999), Payne and Vitale (forthcoming) and Pasquarliello (2001) 
for studies using these data).   8
The Reuters reports indicate that central banks typically intervene during business 
hours in their respective markets.
11  Frequency distributions of the times of G3 
intervention suggest that the BOJ is most likely to intervene at 3:56:36 GMT (or around 
1pm in Tokyo).  The Bundesbank is most likely to intervene at 11:31:16 GMT (or at 
12:30pm in Frankfurt).  And, the Fed is most likely to intervene at 14:57:10 GMT (or 
10am EST).  Table 2 shows the relative timing of the Tokyo, Frankfurt and New York 
markets using the GMT scale and indicates the times when Reuters reports that each 
central bank is most likely to be in the market.  It is worth noting that Tokyo business 
hours end just as the Frankfurt market opens and the New York market overlaps the 
Frankfurt market for two hours.  The New York market closes two hours before the 
Tokyo financial market opens. 
  Getting the timing of interventions right is critical to measuring the short-term 
influence of interventions on foreign exchange markets.  Evidence in Andersen, 
Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003) and Almeida, Goodhart and Payne (1998) suggests 
that conditional mean adjustments of exchange rates to macro news occur quickly 
(though they also find that conditional variance adjustments are more gradual). Tables 3 
and 4 provide descriptive information about the central bank interventions that are 
examined in the next section.  The Fed intervened on 268 occasions over 104 days (in 
either the dem-usd or yen-usd markets) over the sample period August 1989 through 
August 1995. Many of the Fed’s intra-daily interventions were clustered in the same hour 
of the day. Most Fed interventions occurred during the overlap in New York and 
European trading hours. And 31% of Fed interventions were coordinated with the 
                                                 
11 Neely (2000) provides detailed information about the practice of central bank intervention based on 
survey data.    9
Bundesbank in the dem-usd market, while 54% were coordinated with the BOJ in the 
yen-usd market.
12 
Before formally testing for a relationship between exchange rates, intervention 
and macro announcements, it is interesting to examine the 25 largest returns over the 
sample period together with the Reuters time-stamped events that surround these 
unusually large returns.  Tables 4 and 5 present this information for dem-usd and yen-usd 
returns, respectively.  The timing of large returns and the timing of macro announcements 
tends to be very closely aligned.  For example, many of the large returns are timed within 
10 seconds of a (scheduled) macroeconomic announcement.  In contrast, some of the 
large returns are only loosely synchronized with interventions.  The Reuters time-stamp 
typically lags the large returns, sometimes by as much as two hours.  Of course, it is 
possible that the “cause” of the large return is unrelated to any news event reported by 
Reuters.  
IV.  Measuring the Intra-daily influences of central bank interventions 
  A fundamental property of high frequency data is that observations can occur at 
varying time intervals resulting in irregular spacing of quotes. Standard econometric 
techniques require regularly spaced data.   The approach to irregularly spaced data used in 
this paper is to create from these data a regularly spaced time series over a discrete time 














                                                 
12 In the intra-day context a “coordinated” Fed intervention is defined as an intervention that occurs within 
2 hours of a BOJ or Bundesbank intervention.  
   10
where t,h is the sequence of tick recording times which is irregularly spaced, then the 













where t,n is the sequence of the regular-spaced in time data and n is the time interval.
13  
Equivalently, the nth return (R) on day t is defined as: 
(1.5)  ,,,1 tntntn RPP - =-  
and volatility, Vt,n, is measured as the absolute value of the 5-minute returns. 
  A number of previous studies have documented a strong seasonal pattern in the 
average 5-minute exchange rate volatility (see, for example, Bollerslev and Domowitz 
(1993), Dacorogna et al. (1993) and Guillaume et al. (1997)).  This seasonality is also 
readily apparent in both the sample of Fed intervention days and the control sample days. 
Failure to take account of these intra-daily seasonals is likely to result in misleading 
statistical analyses. In this paper de-seasonalization of the volatility series is achieved using 
the Anderson and Bollerslev (1997ab, 1998) version of Gallant’s (1981) flexible fourier 
form regression method.   
  Figures 3 and 4 shows average absolute dem-usd and yen-usd returns, respectively, 
for each 5-minute interval across both the control sample days and the Fed intervention 
days, along with estimated intra-day seasonal.  The seasonal is calculated using the 
Andersen and Bollerslev (1997a) flexible fourier form framework, which decomposes the 
                                                 
    13 In practice the 5 -minute price series used in this paper is formed by averaging the two immediately 
adjacent bid and ask observations to the round 5-minute mark with weights proportional to the distance from 
the end of the interval.     11
demeaned 5-minute returns into a daily volatility factor, st, a periodic component for the 













 The daily volatility component st in practice is estimated from a MA(1)-FIGARCH(1,d,1) 
model for dem-usd and yen-usd fitted over 1752 daily returns from January 1989 though 
December 1995.  And the seasonal component is estimated using a flexible fourier form 
(FFF) regression.  Following Andersen and Bollerslev (1997a), and defining xt,n from 
equation (1.6) as: 
(1.7) 
222
,,,,, 2log[()]loglogloglog tntntnttntn xRERNsZ s ”--+=+ 
the approach is then based on a non-linear regression in the intraday time interval, n, and 
the daily volatility factor, st: 
(1.8) 
22
,,, (;,)log(log) tnttntn xfnZEZ qs =+-  
In the actual implementation the non-linear regression function is approximated by the 




















where N1=(N+1)/2 and N2=(N+1)(N+2)/6 are normalized constants, N refers to the number 
of return intervals per day (N=288), the tuning parameter P (P=8) determines the order of 
the expansion
14, the J flexible fourier forms are parameterized by quadratic components 
                                                 
14 Andersen and Bollerslev (1997a, 1998) and Cai, Cheung, Lee and Melvin (2001) find that P=6 fits the 
dem-usd FXFX data over the sample 92-93 and the yen-usd FXFX data in 1998.  Experimentation with   12
(terms with µ-coefficients), a number of sinusoids (theg  and d  coefficients) and time-
specific dummies (the l  coefficients). In practice estimation involved a two-step 
procedure where  $
, tn x was replaced by the sample mean of the 5-minute returns and treated 
as the dependent variable in the regression defined by equations (1.6) and (1.7).  Defining 
￿
, tn f as the resulting estimate for the right hand side of equation (1.7), then the intraday 
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  An “event study” approach is used to examine the influence of central bank 
intervention (and other macro announcements) on exchange rate volatility.
15 The general 
regression specification is: 
(1.11)  , ,01,,2,
kk
tn tnkiitnitn VDs aaae + =+￿￿++ $ , 
where D
k denotes the (time-stamped to the nearest 5-minute) intervention and other 
announcement dummy variables and  , tn s $  is the FFF volatility seasonal estimated over the 
control sample days.
16 Using this general regression specification it is possible to test for 
the impact and intra-day effects of intervention (and other macro news) by examining 
whether the D
ks are statistically significant. 
                                                                                                                                                 
P=4,6 and 8 using both the control sample and Fed intervention day samples (over the years 1989-1995), 
indicate that P=8 offers the best fit with these data. 
15 See Dominguez (2003a) for a similar “event study” approach using returns rather than volatility. 
16 Estimates of the intra-daily seasonal using the Fed intervention days produced very similar results. 
Control sample days were used under the assumption that volatility on intervention days may differ from 
non-intervention days (indeed figures 3 and 4 suggest that especially for the yen-usd market Fed 
intervention days are more volatile than the control sample days), and while it is necessary to control for 
intra-day cycles, it is also important not to inadvertently explain away what is unusual about intervention 
days by only using intervention days to calculate the seasonal. I am grateful to Michael Melvin for 
suggesting I use the control sample days for this purpose.   13
  Interventions in the event study by all three central banks take the value 1 if they 
involve a purchase or sale of dollars and 0 otherwise.  Interventions are included as (1,0) 
dummy variables both because the dollar magnitudes are generally only available at a 
daily (not intra-daily) frequency, and because there is some evidence that the sizes of 
interventions depend on market reactions to initial trades suggesting that including 
magnitudes might engender simultaneity bias. 
  Table 7 presents the results of the volatility event-study regression using the FXFX 
five-minute dem-usd data. Significant one-hour leads were found for intervention 
operations by all three central banks, suggesting that some traders know about these 
operations well before the Reuters new release.
17 Bundesbank interventions in the sample 
had the largest (positive) influence on volatility by a factor of two relative either to Fed or 
BOJ interventions. Fed interventions continued to influence dem-usd volatility for one hour 
after the Reuters report, while Bundesbank interventions had effects for 25 minutes after 
the report, and BOJ interventions had effects for just 10 minutes after the report.  Only 
announcements by the Fed significantly influenced volatility. Seven of the twelve U.S. and 
German macro announcements are also found to be significant, with the significant lags 
varying from impact to fifteen minutes after the Reuters time-stamp. The announcement 
with the largest average influence on dem-usd variability is U.S. GNP.  The intra-day 
seasonal is highly significant in the regression.  The interventions, announcements, macro 
controls and seasonal together explain just under 25% of intra-day dem-usd volatility. 
                                                 
17 Various regression specifications were attempted, including imposing a polynomial distributed lag (pdl) 
structure on the leads and lags of the intervention variables. Tests of the pdl restrictions suggested that the data 
do not conform to this specification.  Experimentation with various lead and lag combinations indicated that a 
[-1hr,+2hr] window for the intervention variables and a [0,1hr] window for the macroeconomic 
announcements was appropriate.   14
  The results of the yen-usd volatility event-study regression are presented in Table 8. 
In contrast to the analogous dem-usd regression, Bundesbank interventions are not 
statistically significant. There is evidence of one-hour Reuters announcement lags for both 
the Fed and the BOJ. Fed interventions continue to have effects for an hour and a half after 
the Reuters report, and BOJ interventions continue to have effects for one hour after the 
report.  Both Fed and BOJ central bank announcements also influence volality.  Six of 
twelve U.S. and Japanese macro announcements are significant. U.S. GNP again has the 
largest effect. 
  Tables 7 and 8 include results from three alternative regression specifications.  The 
first of these alternative hypotheses asks whether the relationship between interventions 
and volatility is related to the volume of trade.  In particular, the regressions test whether 
Fed interventions that occurred during the overlap in New York and European trading, 
when volume is generally highest, had different effects than those that occurred during 
other time periods.  The results for both the dem-usd and yen-usd suggest that, regardless 
of volume, Fed interventions have statistically significant effects over the 36 (5-min) leads 
and lags.  In both the high and low trade volume times, Fed interventions continued to have 
one-hour lead effects and roughly one-hour lag effects in the dem-usd market, and one-
hour and twenty minute lag effects in the yen-usd market. Results for the remaining 
variables in the regression were little changed by the inclusion of the interactive trade 
volume dummy. The relative size of the coefficients on Fed intervention in low and high 
volume trade volume suggests Fed interventions during high volume periods in the yen-usd 
market had a slightly larger overall effect, and it is worth noting that 61% of Fed 
interventions occurred during high trade volume times.     15
  The second alternative specification serves as a test of whether interventions that 
are timed close to a (scheduled) macro announcement have different effects than those that 
are not. The dummy variable distinguishing those interventions that occurred within a two-
hour window of a macro announcement are significant in both the dem-usd and yen-usd 
volatility regressions. The relative size of the coefficients on the interactive dummy 
suggests that these interventions have larger effects on volatility than interventions that are 
not timed close to other announcements (although these continue to be significant in the 
regressions).  One possible explanation for this result is that traders are more sensitive to 
news (including intervention news) at times when other major announcements are 
released.
18 
  The final set of alternative specifications examines the extent to which coordination 
matters.  Interventions are defined as being “coordinated” if at least one other of the G3 
central banks intervened within a two hour window (and in the same direction). In the case 
of the dem-usd market, 31% of all Fed interventions over this period were coordinated with 
the Bundesbank.  The results suggest that those interventions that were coordinated have a 
slightly larger influence on volatility than unilateral interventions.  Interestingly, the lag 
effects for coordinated interventions last a good hour beyond those for unilateral 
interventions.  In the yen-usd market, 54% of all Fed interventions over this period were 
coordinated with the BOJ.  Results again suggest that both coordinated and unilateral Fed 
interventions influence volatility, though the size of the effect is actually larger for 
unilateral interventions.  As in the dem-usd market, coordinated interventions had 
                                                 
18 Evans and Lyons (2002b) also find that currency trades have greater price impact if they are closely 
timed with macro announcements.   16
significant lag effects on yen-usd volatility for an hour and a half after the Reuters report, 
while the influence of unilateral interventions lasted for about forty-five minutes. 
  The event study results indicate that G3 interventions systematically influenced 
intra-day exchange rate volatility over the sample period examined, August 1989 through 
August 1995.  The coefficient estimates indicate that Reuters reports generally lag 
interventions by one hour, and intervention continues to influence volatility up to one and a 
half hours after the Reuters report release, suggesting that intervention is neither common 
knowledge, nor perfectly informative.  It is also worth noting that all the coefficients on 
intervention in tables 7 and 8 are positive, indicating that in the very short run interventions 
are always associated with increases in volatility. 
  The next set of tests, reported in Tables 9, 10 and 11, examine the influence of G3 
interventions on daily volatility
19. Recall from the model in section II that trader 
heterogeneity can make even informative intervention increase very short run exchange 
rate volatility, though over time interventions should become common knowledge, and 
traders should sort out any misinterpretation of intervention’s information content. Daily 
realized dem-usd and yen-usd volatility is measured using the intra-daily returns data. 
Following Anderson and Bollerslev (1998) we sum the squared 5-minute FXFX indicative 
quote returns over each day (through GMT22)











= ￿  
                                                 
19 A number of papers have examined the influence of intervention on daily exchange rate volatility.  See, 
for example, Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996), Dominguez (1998), Chaboud and LeBaron (2001), Galati, 
Melick and Micu (2002), Frenkel, Pierdzioch, and Stadtmann (2003) and Beine (2003). 
20 The daily integrated volatilities were created by Steve Weinberg. The daily cutoff is GMT22 when 
volatility is generally very low. Weekends are excluded and the volatilities are expressed as annualized 
standard deviations.   17
to create a daily integrated volatility series. This measure better captures current volatility 
relative to standard models such as GARCH because it is able to exploit 
contemporaneous intraday information. As Anderson, Bollerslev, Diebold and Labys 
(2003) explain,  
“Suppose, for example, that the true volatility has been low for many days, 
t=1,...T-1, so that both realized and GARCH volatilities are presently low as well.  
Now suppose that the true volatility increases sharply on day T and that the effect 
is highly persistent as is typical. Realized volatility for day, T, which makes 
effective use of the day-T information, will increase sharply as well, as is 
appropriate.  GARCH or RiskMetrics volatility, in contrast, will not change at all 
on day T, as they depend only on squared returns from days T-1, T-2,..., and they 
will increase only gradually on subsequent days, as they approximate volatility 
via a long and slowly decaying exponentially weighted moving average.”  
 
 In the context of measuring the impact of interventions on volatility – it is particularly 
important that our measure of volatility reflect current (and not necessarily past) market 
conditions. Figures 5 and 6 show the integrated volatility series as well as a MA(1)-
GARCH(1,1) volatility measure for the dem-usd and yen-usd, respectively.  
Unsurprisingly the GARCH series are much smoother than the integrated volatility series, 
though both sets of volatilities tend to move together. 
  Table 9 presents statistics on the distribution of the logarithm of realized volatility 
for dem-usd and yen-usd, over the full sample period as well as on intervention days. For 
the full sample (and non-intervention days sample) the measures of skewness and 
kurtosis suggest the series are approximately Gaussian and the Ljung-Box statistics 
indicate strong serial correlation.
21  Further, the estimates of the degree of fractional 
                                                 
21  Five observations in the dem-usd realized volatility series were significant outliers and are excluded 
from the sample.  Realized volatility on September 14, 1992 is two times higher than the second highest 
day and realized volatilities on September 3-4, 1991and May 12-13, 1994 are three times smaller than the 
next lowest day.  We replaced these outliers with values from the next highest (or lowest) realized 
volatilities in the sample distribution. Replacing these outliers does not significantly change the regression 
results in Table 10, but does influence the skewness and kurtosis statistics for the full and non-intervention   18
integration, d, are significantly greater than zero and less than .5, which indicates 
evidence of long-run dependence in the logarithmic volatilities. It is interesting to note 
that on “all” interventions days, and particularly on coordinated intervention days, the 
mean realized volatility is significantly larger than on non-intervention days. Realized 
volatility on the day after an intervention remains higher for the dem-usd but not for yen-
usd, and volatility on the day before an intervention is no higher, on average, than on 
other non-intervention days. 
The statistics in table 9 suggest that the long-memory dynamics of the realized 
logarithmic volatilities are best modeled using a fractional integration or ARFIMA 
(autoregressive, fractionally integrated, moving average) model.  Experimentation with 
the two realized volatility series suggests that for the dem-usd an ARFIMA(1,d,0) best 
describes the data, while for the yen-usd we use an ARFIMA(0,d,0) model. In order to 
test whether daily interventions are correlated with realized volatility we include a 
holiday dummy variable (H) to control for holiday and market closure effects as well as 
daily contemporaneous and lagged G3 intervention indicators (the D





















where d is the fractional parameter, L denotes the lag operator, f  denotes the AR 
parameter (set to 0 in the case of yen-usd), vt denotes the log of the integrated volatility 
                                                                                                                                                 
samples in Table 9. There were no apparent outliers in the yen-usd realized volatility series.   19
(
FXFX s ) at time t,  0 a is an intercept, 1
k a is the intervention parameter vector, and 2 a  is the 
holiday parameter.
22  
  The results in table 10 indicate that coordinated interventions continue to 
systematically influence daily contemporaneous dem-usd and yen-usd volatility, though 
there is no evidence that the influence of coordinated interventions extends beyond the day 
of the operations.  Similarly, contemporaneous unilateral Fed, Bundesbank and BOJ 
operations all influence daily realized volatility in both markets.  In the yen-usd market 
unilateral Fed interventions are marginally significant after 3 days. The relative magnitudes 
of the coefficients in the daily regressions suggest that coordinated interventions have a 
substantially larger impact on daily volatility than do unilateral interventions. Coordinated 
operations were also significant in the intra-day tests, though the relative size of the 
coefficients on coordinated and unilateral operations were similar. This suggests that over 
the course of the day the influence of coordinated operations (which may have a lower 
probability of containing non-fundamental information) increases. Overall, the results in 
tables 7-10 indicate that interventions by all three central banks positively influenced intra-
day and daily (contemporaneous) exchange rate volatility.  There is little evidence that 
interventions systematically influence volatility beyond the day of the operations.
23 
  The ARFIMA model specification in 1.13 implicitly assumes that shocks on 
intervention days are as persistent as shocks on non-intervention days.  A final set of 
                                                 
22 Estimation is based on the numerical quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) algorithm, where the likelihood 
function is based on the Wold representation of the ARFIMA(1,d,0) processes with a Gaussian assumption. 
The t-statistics reported in the tables are calculated using the corresponding heteroskedastic-consistent 
standard errors based on finite difference approximation. 
23 One day leads of coordinated and unilateral Fed interventions were also included in the regression 
specification but lead coefficients were never statistically significant and are not reported in table 10.  
These results are available from the author upon request.   20
regressions tests whether this assumption is valid by allowing the persistence of volatility 

































t n and 
I
t n  are daily realized volatility on non-intervention and intervention days, 
respectively.  Note that if  0 0
I a = ,  11
nI aa = , and
nI bb =  1.14 approximately reduces to 
an ARMA(1,1) model.  Regression estimates of this model are given in Table 11 and 
indicate that the persistence of shocks on intervention and non-intervention days is not 
statistically different.  The likelihood ratio statistics suggest that we cannot reject the joint 
hypothesis that  0 0
I a = ,  1
n a = 1
I a  and 
n b =
I b .  Further, the estimates of
I b  (the coefficient 
on lagged volatility on intervention days) suggest that the effects of shocks to volatility 
on intervention days fall by half in 1.5 days for dem-usd and 3 days for yen-usd. 
 
 V. Conclusions 
  This paper identifies circumstances in which central bank interventions influence 
exchange rates.  Microstructure theory suggests that trader heterogeneity can cause 
exchange rates to move away from fundamentals in the short-run.  Introducing intervention 
operations into an already confused market, in turn, can increase the influence of non-
fundamentals trading on exchange rate movements.  Over time, however, interventions are 
common knowledge and traders should be able to distinguish informative from non-
                                                 
24 Jones, Lamont and Lumsdaine (1998) estimate a similar model to measure the influence of 
macroeconomic information on the persistence of bond market volatility.   21
informative interventions.  This suggests that the influence of interventions on exchange 
rates may well differ over the very short and longer runs.   
  The empirical tests in this paper examine the influence of G3 interventions on dem-
usd and yen-usd intra-daily (5-minute) indicative quote volatility as well as a measure of 
realized daily volatility.  Results suggest that intervention operations, especially those that 
were coordinated, were consistently associated with increases in intra-day and daily 
volatility, while there is little evidence that interventions influenced longer-term volatility.  
The fact that interventions did not lead to longer-term increases in volatility may help 
explain why governments, who presumably prefer not to increase market volatility, 
continue to rely on interventions to influence currency values.    22
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Table 1 Timing of Selected Reuters Announcements (1989-1995) 
 
 
News Event  Day-of-week 
 
Average time  
   (GMT) 
     
Fed Intervention  various  14:57:10 
US Employment  Friday  12:30(DST);13:30 
US CPI/PPI  Friday  12:30(DST);13:30 
US M1  Thursday       20:30(DST);21:30 
US Trade  various  12:30(DST);13:30 
US Consumer Credit  various  19:30(DST)20:30 
US Retail Sales  various  12:30(DST);13:30 
US Leading Indicators  Wed or Fri  12:30(DST);13:30 
US GNP  various  12:30(DST);13:30 
FOMC news  Friday  20:30(DST);21:30 
comments by US officials       various    14:48:12 
     
Bundesbank Intervention  various  11.31:16 
Bundesbank Meeting  Thursday       11:30(DST):12:30 
German M3  various  6:30(DST);7:30 
comments by German officials  various  10:27:13 
     
BOJ Intervention  various  3:56:36 
Japanese Current Account  various  6:30(DST);7:30 
comments by Japanese officials  various  6:51:07   





Table 2 Typical timing of G3 interventions during the 24 hour GMT clock 
 
  GMT24(t-1)  GMT3  GMT8  GMT11  GMT14  GMT17  GMT22 
Tokyo  9am  12pm  5pm         
  BOJ interventions         
Frankfurt      9am  12pm  3pm  6pm   
      Bundesbank Interventions   
New York          9am  12pm  5pm 
          Fed Interventions 
GMT is Greenwich Mean Time.   27
Table 3 G3 Central Bank Intervention Descriptive Statistics 1989-1995 
 
  Fed   Buba  BOJ  Any 
CB 
Number of intervention days  104  39  63  206 
Total number of intra-day interventions  268  83  145  496 
Probability of a 2
nd intervention within 1 hour of 
prior one 
0.56  0.29  0.26  0.49 
Number of interventions followed by another one 
within 1 hour 
156  24  37  244 
Total number of intervention clusters  44  25  16  83 
Average duration of intervention clusters,  
each 1 hour apart 
0:44:49  0:45:30  0:35:08  0:42:48 
Average number of interventions in a cluster  5.023  2.52  2.5  4.048 




Table 4 Timing of G3 Central Bank Interventions in the dem-usd and yen-usd markets 
 
  Dem-usd  yen-usd 
Percent of Interventions closely timed with macro announcements     
   1. all interventions (any bank)  7%  10% 
   2. Fed interventions  7%  13% 
   3. Buba interventions  6%  15% 
   4. BOJ interventions  9%  4.5% 
Percent of Fed Interventions     
    1. occurring before 12:00 est  42.6%  57% 
    2. occurring after 12:00 est  13.4%  16% 
    3. unknown  0.004%  3% 
    4. occurring in both the am and pm  44%  24% 
Percent of Fed Interventions occurring during European Trading  61%  61% 
Percent of Fed Interventions Coordinated     
    1. with Buba  31%   
    2. with BOJ    54% 
Note: “closely timed” is defined as occurring within 2 hours. Likewise, “coordinated” 
Fed interventions are defined as interventions that occur within 2 hours of a BOJ or 
Bundesbank intervention. 
 
   28
  Table 5 The 25 Largest 5-min dem-usd Returns (1989-95) 
 
 
DATE  TIME  RETURN  EVENT*  REUTERS TIME-STAMP 
         
9/15/89  12:35:00  0.009458  CPI;Trade  12:36;12:36 
9/15/89  18:20:00  0.005188  Fed  13:56 
9/15/89  18:25:00  0.011564  BB  14:28 
10/5/89  13:05:00  0.005004  BB  12:09 and 13:11 
10/6/89  12:35:00  0.005968  Employment  12:34 
1/10/90  15:15:00  0.006123  Fed  19:05 
3/19/91  13:10:00  0.00525   Fed;BB  16:00-16:13 
3/19/91  13:40:00  0.00514  CPI;Housing Starts  13:33 
3/19/91  14:35:00  0.005161  Fed;BB  16:00-16:13 
3/19/91  14:40:00  0.005647  Fed;BB  16:00-16:13 
3/19/91  14:45:00  0.008245  Fed;BB  16:00-16:13 
5/17/91  14:30:00  0.007094  Fed;BB  19:15-20:53 
5/17/91  14:35:00  0.005674  Fed;BB  19:15-20:53 
5/17/91  15:05:00  0.005492  Fed;BB  19:15-20:53 
7/12/91  13:25:00  0.005715  Fed;BB  13:27 
7/20/92  14:20:00  0.005532  Fed;BB  14:30 
7/20/92  14:30:00  0.006298  Fed;BB  14:30 
8/11/92  12:20:00  0.005553  Fed;BB  12:30 
8/21/92  13:25:00  0.006027  Fed;BB  13:35 
4/29/94  14:30:00  0.006037  Fed  14:40 
11/2/94  16:05:00  0.007848  Fed  16:13-18:53 
5/31/95  12:40:00  0.010738  Fed  12:49 
5/31/95  12:45:00  0.005854  BB  12:45 
5/31/95  12:55:00  0.006077  Fed  12:51-12:54 











NOTE:  At least one Fed interventions occurred on each of the days in the sample. 
 
* Events are defined as any macro announcement or central bank intervention that 
occurred within a [-1hr,5hr] window of the large return.   29
 
  Table 6 The 25 Largest 5-min yen-usd Returns (1989-95) 
 
 
DATE  TIME  RETURN  EVENT*  REUTERS TIME-STAMP 
         
9/15/89  12:35:00  0.005344  CPI;Trade;Fed;BB  12:36;12:36;13:56;14:28 
9/15/89  18:20:00  0.007393  Fed;BB  13:56;14:28 
9/15/89  18:25:00  0.005687  Fed;BB  13:56;14:28 
9/15/89  18:35:00  0.006791  Fed;BB  13:56;14:28 
10/6/89  12:35:00  0.005976  Employment;Fed  12:34;13:42 
1/17/92  18:35:00  0.005997  Fed  18:38 
1/17/92  19:10:00  0.005314  BOJ  19:14 
1/17/92  19:15:00  0.004613  BOJ  19:14 
4/27/93  12:55:00  0.004626  Fed  13:05-14:15 
8/19/93  12:35:00  0.005207  Trade  12:30 
8/19/93  14:30:00  0.005635  Fed  14:39 
8/19/93  15:05:00  0.005217  Fed  15:07 
4/29/94  13:10:00  0.005025  Fed  14:38-16:08 
5/4/94  12:30:00  0.005113  Fed;BB  12:33;12:34 
6/24/94  13:15:00  0.005839  Fed;BB;BOJ  13:45-16:59 
6/24/94  13:35:00  0.005378  Fed;BB;BOJ  13:45-16:59 
11/2/94  16:05:00  0.007266  Fed  16:13-18:58 
5/31/95  12:40:00  0.008712  Fed  12:49 
5/31/95  12:45:00  0.008348  BB  12:45 
5/31/95  12:55:00  0.007176  Fed  12:51-12:54 
5/31/95  14:30:00  0.004466  Fed  13:47 
8/2/95  13:10:00  0.005012  Fed;BOJ               13:13;13:30 
8/15/95  12:20:00  0.005948  BB;Fed;BOJ         12:49;12:58 
8/15/95  23:25:00  0.004811  Fed;BB;US Retail Sales  14:28;14:24;19:06 









NOTE:  At least one Fed intervention occurred on each of the days in the sample. 
 
* Events are defined as any macro announcement or central bank intervention that 
occurred within a [-1hr,5hr] window of the large return.   30
Table 7 Influence of Interventions on Intra-Day dem-usd Volatility 
  , ,01,,2,
kk
tn tnkiitnitn VDs aaae + =+￿￿++ $  
where V is 5-min dem-usd volatility (measured as the absolute value of the 5-min 
returns); the D
ks include intervention, official central bank announcements and  macro 
announcements; i=-1 to +2hrs for the G-3 intervention variables and official 
announcements and i=0 to +1hr for the macro announcements; t,n is the sequence of the 
regular-spaced (every 5 minutes) intra-daily data for all the days on which the Fed 
intervened against the mark from 1989 to 1995 (69 days and a total of 151 reports of Fed 
operations). The reported coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
 
















Independent Variable  Coeff sum
4  Coeff sum  Coeff sum  Coeff sum 
Fed Intervention    0.121**           
Buba Intervention    0.213**    0.212**    0.214**  Na 
BOJ Intervention    0.103**    0.103**    0.104**  Na 
Official Announcements  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Macro Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fed Interventions 
During High Trade 
Volume 
   
  0.122** 
   
Fed Interventions 
During Low Trade 
Volume 
    
  0.121** 
   
Fed Interventions Close 
to Macro News 
      0.138**   
Isolated  
Fed Interventions 
      0.116**   
Coordinated 
G-3 Interventions 
        0.139** 
Unilateral  
Fed Interventions 
        0.122* 
FFF Seasonal  0.169**  0.169**  0.169**  0.173** 
R2    0.237    0.237    0.237    0.236 
D.W.    1.99    1.99    1.99    1.99 
 
Number of observations= 19,833.  
1 High trade volume is defined as the overlap in US 
and European trading hours.  
2 Interventions that occur within 2 hours of a macro news 
announcement are defined as “close”. 
3 Coordinated interventions are defined as Fed 
interventions that occur on the same day as at least one other of the G-3 central banks. 
4The coefficient is the sum of the 36 lead and lag coefficients on each of the intervention 
variables. **, * denote statistical significance (of the 36 leads and lags) at the 1%, and 
5% levels, respectively, using robust standard errors.   31
Table 8 Influence of Interventions on Intra-Day yen-usd Volatility 
  , ,01,,2,
kk
tn tnkiitnitn VDs aaae + =+￿￿++ $  
where V is 5-min yen-usd volatility; D
ks  include intervention, official central bank 
announcements and  macro announcements; i=-1 to +2hrs for the G-3 intervention 
variables and official announcements and i=0 to +1hr for the macro announcements; t,n is 
the sequence of the regular-spaced (every 5 minutes) intra-daily data for all the days on 
which the Fed intervened against the yen from 1989 to 1995 (66 days and a total of 192 
reports of Fed operations). The reported coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
 
















Independent Variable  Sum coeff
4  Sum coeff  Sum coeff  Sum coeff 
Fed Intervention    0.175**           
Buba Intervention    0.063    0.058    0.066  na 
BOJ Intervention    0.121**    0.121**    0.123**  na 
Official Announcements  Yes  Yes  Yes  yes 
Macro Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  yes 
Fed Interventions 
During High Trade 
Volume 
    
  0.183** 
   
Fed Interventions During 
Low Trade Volume 
    0.164**     
Fed Interventions Close 
to Macro News 
      0.192**   
Isolated  
Fed Interventions 
      0.148**   
Coordinated 
G-3 Interventions 
        0.149** 
Unilateral  
Fed Interventions 
        0.271* 
FFF Seasonal  0.168**  0.166**  0.168**  0.164** 
R2  0.188  0.188  0.188  0.189 
D.W.  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00 
 
Number of observations= 18,969. 
1 High trade volume is defined as the overlap in US and 
European trading hours.  
2 Interventions that occur within 2 hours of a macro news 
announcement are defined as “close”.  
3 Coordinated interventions are defined as Fed 
interventions that occur on the same day as at least one other of the G-3 central banks. 
4The coefficient is the sum of the 36 lead and lag coefficients on each of the intervention 
variables. **, and * denote statistical significance (of the 36 leads and lags) at the 1% and 
5% levels, respectively, using robust standard errors.    32
Table 9 Summary Statistics for Daily dem-usd and yen-usd Log Realized Volatility 





  Mean  Std-
dev 




Q(20)  d  AR  Obs 
Dem-usd  -2.224  0.425  -0.967  -5.776  -2.565  20.336  1811.0  0.273  0.203  1564 




Dem-usd  -2.234  0.425  -0.967  -5.776  -2.727  21.254  1644.2  0.267  0.204  1477 
Yen-usd  -2.288  0.392  -1.075  -5.133  -1.475  10.624  2378.9  0.413  0.059  1313 
 
III. All Intervention Days
b 
Dem-usd  -2.067  0.391  -1.067  -2.750  0.494  -0.540  123.2  0.395  na  87 
Yen-usd  -2.050  0.352  -0.703  -2.945  0.259  0.334  454.8  0.400  na  251 
 
IV. Coordinated Intervention Days
c 
Dem-usd  -1.935  0.386  -1.169  -2.750  0.025  -0.614  26.6  0.280  na  33 
Yen-usd  -2.052  0.423  -1.127  -2.945  0.115  -0.666  72.9  0.477  na  59 
 
V. Day Before (All) Intervention Days
d 
Dem-usd  -2.100  0.365  -1.261  -2.703  0.470  -0.726  17.1  na  na  44 
Yen-usd  -2.204  0.346  -1.075  -2.891  0.819  1.193  58.7  0.331  na  84 
 
VI. Day After (All) Intervention Days
d 
Dem-usd  -2.176  0.337  -1.284  -3.056  -0.014  0.617  29.2  na  na  44 
Yen-usd  -2.271  0.441  -1.075  -4.920  -2.085  15.220  35.7  0.323  na  84 
 
Notes: The sample covers the period August 15, 1989 through August 15, 1995.  The daily 
realized volatilities are constructed from sums of 5-minute squared returns, and are expressed as 
annualized standard deviations. The statistics refer to the distribution of logarithmic realized 
standard deviations.  The column labeled Q(20) contains Ljung-Box test statistics for up to the 
twentieth order serial correlation. The column labeled “d” gives the regression estimate of the 
fractional integration parameter, d, from an ARFIMA(1,d,0) model.  The column labeled “AR” is 
the regression estimate of the autoregressive parameter from the ARFIMA(1,d,0) model. 
a  Five observations in the dem-usd realized volatility series were significant outliers and are 
excluded from the full and non-intervention samples.  Realized volatility on September 14, 1992 
is two times higher than the second highest day and realized volatilities on September 3-4, 
1991and May 12-13, 1994 are three times smaller than the next lowest day.  We replaced these 
outliers with values from the next highest (or lowest) realized volatilities in the sample 
distribution. There were no apparent outliers in the yen-usd realized volatility series. 
b “All” intervention days include days of unilateral and coordinated Fed, Bundesbank and BOJ 
intervention operations. 
c Coordinated intervention days are defined as days when the Fed intervened with either the 
Bundesbank or the BOJ (or both). 
d The number of days before and after an intervention excludes intervention days that follow or 
precede other intervention days.   33





















where  t v is the log of the sum of intra-day squared 5-minute returns (through 22GMT) 
excluding weekends, Ht is a dummy variable indicating the day after a holiday or market 
closure and the D
ks are dummy variables that denote daily unilateral and coordinated 
intervention operations.  
 
Independent Variables  DEM-USD  Yen-USD 
ARFIMA parameters  Coeff  t-stat  Coeff  t-stat 
    0 a   -2.257**  -37.452  -2.374**  -18.122 
    D  0.270**  5.951  0.455**  7.019 
   f   0.223*  2.325     
   w   0.119**  7.052  0.083**  8.470 
 Holiday dummy  0.083  1.507  0.006  0.134 
Fed Unilateral Intervention  0.148*  2.245  0.354  1.379 
     Lag t-1  -0.030  -0.543  0.216  1.601 
     Lag t-2  -0.025  -0.448  0.139  0.978 
     Lag t-3  -0.033  -0.575  0.197†  1.811 
     Lag t-4  0.083  1.442  0.223  1.250 
     Lag t-5  0.100  1.522  -0.034  -0.329 
Fed Coordinated Intervention     0.296**  4.487  0.317**  5.951 
     Lag t-1  -0.030  -0.543  0.042  0.902 
     Lag t-2  -0.025  -0.448  0.004  0.098 
     Lag t-3  -0.033  -0.575  0.045  0.882 
     Lag t-4  0.083  1.442  0.046  0.967 
     Lag t-5  0.100  1.522  -0.033  -0.687 
Buba/ BOJ Unilateral Intervention  0.152†  1.885  0.083**  8.470 
Log Likelihood  -552.749  -276.532 
No of daily observations  1564  1564 
 
Note:  An ARFIMA(1,d,0) was used to model dem-usd integrated volatility and an 
ARFIMA(0,d,0) was used to model yen-usd integrated volatility.  Results for the 
variables of interest (the D
ks) were robust to alternative ARFIMA specifications.  **, * 
and † denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, using robust 
standard errors.  
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Table 11 Influence of Shocks on Realized Volatility on Non-Intervention 

































t n  are the log of the sum of intra-day squared 5-minute returns (through 
22GMT) excluding weekends on non-intervention and intervention days, respectively. Ht 
is a dummy variable indicating the day after a holiday or market closure and the D
I is a 
dummy variable that denotes G3 intervention operations.  
 
  DEM-USD  Yen-USD 
Parameter  Coeff  t-stat  Coeff  t-stat 
0
n a   -2.240  -89.848**  -2.311  -60.965** 
0
I a   0.012  0.239  0.030  1.615 
1
n a   0.513  4.244**  0.451  5.346** 
1
I a   0.647  2.364*  0.479  6.706** 
2 a   0.203  3.857**  0.204  7.536** 
3 a   0.081  1.258  0.005  0.131 
n b   0.633  4.236**  0.849  11.306** 
I b   0.736  10.775**  0.838  5.703** 
w   0.123  7.418**  0.085  9.599** 
Log Likelihood  -576.48  -293.319 
Likelihood Ratio Statistic  2.371  4.304 
 
Note:  ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively, using robust 
standard errors. The likelihood ratio statistics suggest that we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
0 0
I a = , 1
n a = 1
I a  and 
n b =
I b , or in other words, that the persistence of shocks on 
intervention and non-intervention days is not statistically different. The 
I b  estimates 
suggest that the effects of shocks on intervention days fall by half in 1.5 days for dem-usd 
and 3 days for yen-usd. 
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Figure 1 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Jan-89 Nov-89 Sep-90 Jul-91 May-92 Mar-93 Jan-94 Nov-94 Sep-95
Realized Volatility
MA(1)-GARCH(1,1)